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Czech Foreign Policy – Small State 
or Middle Power Approach?
Ladislav Cabada
Abstract: The majority of countries in the world are small states. Their role grew 
up rapidly in the period after the Second World War and especially after the end of the 
Cold War. In this period new themes appeared in the international relations and small 
states profiled on them as so-called middle powers. Development aid and cooperation or 
support for human security were two such a themes. The Czech Republic too could in the 
near future aspire to become a medium-sized power. Czech foreign policy was formed 
in the dynamic period after the end of the bipolar conflict of the Great Powers and the 
disintegration of the Czechoslovak Federation. Nevertheless, since the very beginning 
the Czech Republic has been able to define its clear priorities, often with reference to the 
historical development of Czechoslovak statehood. The euphoric period when the Czech 
Republic was established could be one of the reasons why the first official concept of 
Czech foreign policy was presented as late as 1998. These policies, and later policies 
since 2002, represent a combination of small state and medium-sized power strategies. 
The article analyses which themes could be the vehicle for transforming Czech foreign 
policy from that of a small state towards the policy of a middle power.
Key Words: small states, middle powers, foreign policy, international relations, 
Czech Republic
Introduction
The Czech Republic is one of the newest European states. It came into being on 
1 January 1993, when after the peacefully agreed split of the two parts of the Czecho-
slovak Federal Republic two emergent states appeared on the map of Europe – the 
Czech and Slovak Republics. After the break-up of Czechoslovakia the foreign policy 
philosophy and activity of both states had to reflect the new geopolitical and foreign 
policy realities in which they found themselves – in the case of the Czech Republic 
undoubtedly to a lesser extent than was the case in the Slovak Republic62 – even if 
basic foreign policy remained the same. 
62 The political representation of the Czech and Slovak Republics during talks on the disintegration of the 
Czechoslovak Federation agreed that neither of the Republics would be the exclusive state emerging 
from the disintegration of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics. Therefore, both states shortly after 
their formation asked to join the UN and other international organizations; until then the Czechoslovak 
Federation was a member of the UN. Despite this, it can be said that with regard to mental image the 
Czechoslovak Federation has been replaced by the Czech Republic rather than Slovakia. This is also 
because of several symbols, most tangibly the Czechoslovak flag, but also the Czechoslovak anthem 
(first part), and the election of the former Czechoslovak President Václav Havel as President of the 
Czech Republic. Furthermore, the Czech Republic was more frequently understood as the continuation 
of former Czechoslovakia.
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The abandonment of the Czechoslovak Federation by the Czechs and Slovaks and 
the creation of two independent states meant, among other things, the diminishing of 
the “real“ size and international-political significance of both states. On the other hand, 
however, at least this was understood by some of the Czech and Slovak political actors 
as a clarification and at reorganization of the geopolitical position of the states that 
is their position in international relations. After the disintegration of Czechoslovakia 
both countries consciously joined a group of small European states that corresponded 
more or less to the diplomatic rhetoric of their representatives.
Early after its foundation the Czech Republic declared63 that good relations with 
its neighbours, entry to Western economic, political and military structures (European 
Union and NATO) and good relations with powers were its basic foreign policy prio-
rities. These aims have basically not changed at all in the almost 13 years of existence 
of an independent Czech Republic. However, it would be a mistake to say that in the 
sphere of Czech foreign policy nothing has changed.
The aim of this article is to analyse the foundations of the foreign policy of the 
Czech Republic as a so-called small state and compare them with the development, 
changing foundations, ambitions and actual manifestations of Czech foreign policy. 
I would like to concentrate especially on the question of whether Czech foreign policy 
is from now on exhibiting the policy characteristic of a small state or whether it is 
moving to a position which we could consider as the policy of a medium-sized power, 
i.e. a medium-sized country. I would like to put the research, which is based on both an 
analysis of policy matters (foreign policy, security policy, development aid policy and 
the like), executive institutional-political institutions in the Czech Republic (especially 
the Government and individual ministries) and on current analyses of Czech experts 
concerned with international relations and international policy, into a theoretical 
framework of research of small states and their role and position in international 
politics. 
The Czech Republic – a small or medium-sized state?
Although the issue of the role and position of small states in international relations 
is among the most analysed themes in the field of international relations, there is not 
a single definition of a small state. Experts agree on the fact that small states make 
up the majority of countries in the world, and the basis of this statement is use of the 
dichotomy of the small state versus a power. In this concept a small state is every 
state, which on the basis of criteria that is frequently subjective, cannot be regarded 
as a power. This dichotomy is naturally disrupted in the “descent” from the global to 
a lower, especially regional level. States which would from a global perspective not be 
regarded as powers can, in a regional context, including only a sub-continental sector, 
63 For example in the speech of Josef Zieleniec, Minister of Foreign Affairs, before the Lower Chamber of 
Parliament of the Czech Republic on 21 April 1993 (see below), which to a certain extent addressed the 
lack of foreign policies of the first Cabinet of Václav Klaus.
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aspire to the role of a “regional power“. In the global perspective Poland is regarded 
as a small state rather than a power, but if we concentrate on the Central European 
Region then it is a regarded as a regional power.
Small states were regarded by advocates of realistic approaches mainly as an 
object rather than a subject of international relations; their existence was regarded as 
temporary, possibly limited in their full sovereignty by the positions of large states. 
This approach is succinctly formulated by American researcher Nicholas Spykman, 
who wrote: “Small states represent a vacuum in the field of high political pressure. 
Their existence does not come from their strength but the fact that nobody claims 
their territory or that they have to be preserved as buffer states or weights in the power 
balance of interests of powerful nations. When this balance disappears the small states 
usually disappear with it” (Krejčí, 1993: 3). 
The difference between a large and a small state, like the difference between 
a small state and a regional power, can be determined on the basis of various criteria, 
for example territorial extent, size of the population, ability to contribute to conflict 
resolution in a regional context and the like. All of these characteristics determine 
the strength and power of a state, which are the criteria dividing states into groups of 
small, and possibly large states. However, according to Petr Robejšek, it is evident 
that the basic criteria of the power of a state in contemporary international relations 
are represented by its economic power. “Even several years ago foreign policy meant 
military power. Sooner or later it depended on who had more soldiers. Today economic 
power occupies first place, and international policy moves on an escalating scale from 
trade to trade war” (Robejšek, 2002; 30). 
According to Robejšek, therefore, the international-political strength of individual 
states can lead to their economic power. I personally feel that this is a rather simplistic 
approach because firstly, it is not clear under which criteria the author is judging 
economic power (high gross domestic product, high income per capita, high growth 
percentage of gross domestic product or other criteria and secondly, economic power 
does not necessarily give individual states a sphere of influence in international relati-
ons (the Sultanate of Brunei is undoubtedly a rich state but in international relations it 
remains a small country and is only barely noticeable).
I do not want, however, to repudiate the criterion of economic strength as a sign 
that a specific state is not a small state. There is no doubt that among states that 
have a similar size or populations there may be fundamental differences from the 
viewpoint of economic efficiency, and we have a tendency to “elevate“ economically 
more successful states from the category of small states to the category of others. In 
this regard, the considerations of political scientists and politicians move in the right 
direction, included in the dichotomy of the small state versus the “central” power type, 
i.e. a medium-sized state. These states – especially in Western and Northern Europe 
but also, for example, Canada – are in specialist literature in particular indicated by the 
term middle powers, which should mean states exceeding the standard limitations of 
so-called small states in international politics. 
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For example, according to Canadian political scientist Donald M. Behringer (2003: 
1–2), during the Cold War research in international relations, which was dominated by 
realists, concentrated above all on the role and function of powers. In the period after 
the end of the Cold War attention is being turned, however, to medium-sized states, 
which in some areas of international relations (development aid and cooperation, 
human security concepts and the like) take a leadership role. As Behringer states, 
medium-sized states considered, for example, to be countries such as Canada, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway64, are not characterized by “objective“ criteria, 
such as population size or gross domestic product: their definition is linked to beha-
viour in international relations. Medium-sized states show the tendency to push for 
multilateral solutions to international problems or a tendency to adopt a compromise 
position in international disputes. According to Behringer, the main characteristic of 
middle powers is the acceptance of the fact that “citizens and governments of the 
industrialized countries have an ethical responsibility towards those living beyond the 
boundaries of this world, which suffers from want and poverty“ (Behringer, 2003: 2).
The thesis mentioned above suggests that we must search for medium-sized powers 
especially, if not exclusively in the Euro-Atlantic sphere. This assumption to a certain 
extent corresponds to the division of small states offered by Jiří Štěpanovský (1998: 
21). In his text he concentrates only on Europe, but if we replace the term “Europe” 
with “Euro-Atlantic sphere”, we can make use of his conclusions without restrictions. 
According to Štěpanovský, there were types of small states in the Cold War in Europe: 
1) small states of Central Europe under the control of the Soviet Union; 2) small 
European states which are members of the European Union and NATO; and 3) neutral 
states developing economic relations with the West and at the same time emphasizing 
their orientation towards a policy of non-engagement. According to Štěpanovský, 
the partial reconfiguration of small European states again into three groups occurred 
after the end of the Cold War. The groups are: 1) small Western European states 
experiencing peace and relative prosperity, which are joined by neutral states; 2) small 
Central European states in transition; and 3) small states in the Balkan zone, suffering 
from open conflicts (Štěpanovský, 1998: 21).
Let us disregard the fact that in his analysis and second typology the author does 
not include small states in the post-Soviet region, i.e. the states that are independent of 
the EU, and let us make use of the positive results of his analysis. In my judgment, the 
author correctly anticipates the shift of neutral countries (Sweden, Finland, Austria) 
to Western Europe, characterized by greater involvement in international relations, 
including discussion on the benefits and character of neutrality in the countries menti-
64 Some authors regard Czechoslovakia before 1989 as a medium-sized power. For example, B. Wood 
(1988, cit. according to Hampson, 1992: 193) classifies Czechoslovakia in a group of medium-sized 
powers including Italy, China, Brazil, Canada, Spain, The Netherlands, India, Mexico, Australia, 
Poland, Nigeria, South Africa, Argentina, Yugoslavia, Venezuela, Romania, Norway, Finland, Hungary, 
Pakistan, Algeria, South Korea, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia and Iran. In this view the only superpowers 
are the Soviet Union and the USA; other countries are not countries of medium-sized importance, even 
if they could be strong economically (e.g. Germany and Japan).
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oned. The second group of countries is noteworthy – the central European countries in 
the period of transition. The Czech Republic can be included here without a doubt. As 
Štěpanovský states, small Central European states do not show the same characteristics 
as small Western European countries. Although the author does not develop this idea 
further, we can suspect that he considers the position of small Western European states 
as stronger than the position of Central European states. Some Western European small 
nations can be characterized as “small powers“, i.e. medium-sized countries.
The third country mentioned by the author is likewise noteworthy; for its classification 
he used the term “Balkan Zone State”. The small countries in Southeastern Europe 
found themselves in the vortex of conflicts, which basically changed their position 
in international relations. From the viewpoint of the theme of this article the decline 
in economic efficiency and stability of these states (we should remember that the 
average income per capita in Macedonia is the same in Namibia in Africa) is especially 
noteworthy. These countries became the recipients of significant international aid, wi-
thout which the whole regions and countries would have been threatened by a serious 
crisis, possibly the collapse of state power, as we witnessed in 1997 in Albania. 
I would like to conclude the theoretically-oriented introduction to the issue of 
research of small, i.e. medium-sized countries, by stating that it is not possible to 
determine objective and always usable criteria for differentiating small states, i.e. me-
dium-sized powers. Economic prosperity in combination with a willingness to engage 
in the chosen field of international politics, on the basis of other than (neo)realistic 
approaches to international relations, appears to me as fundamental.
Historical roots of Czech foreign policy 
Czech, i.e. Czechoslovak, foreign policy was first formulated during the period 
after the outbreak of the First World War. Even during earlier periods, analyses 
were made of the position of the Czech nation in international relations. The studies, 
however, were limited and influenced by the actual position of the Czech nation 
within the Hapsburg monarchy (e.g. the thesis of František Palacký on the necessity 
of existence of a strong state in Central Europe, which would, on the one hand, divide 
Western Europe from the Ottoman Empire and Russia and, on the other hand, would 
blunt radical Pan-German ideas and activities, which regarded Central Europe as 
German; or Kramář’s vision of a Slavic Empire including the Kingdom of Bohemia). 
In my opinion, the conditions for the consideration of the independence of the Czech 
(Czechoslovak) state were evidently not created until the First World War.
Credit for the international-political establishment of the notion of an independent 
Czechoslovakia (and other Central European, Baltic and Balkan States) goes mainly 
to T. G. Masaryk and, through him, the governing Czechoslovak International Com-
mittee, which gained the support of France, Great Britain and especially the USA, 
for this idea. Masaryk’s ideas of the form of Czechoslovakia during the war years 
basically did not change (See Map “Masaryk’s Idea of Bohemia in 1914“ in Krejčí, 
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1993: 66), however his consideration of the securing of the Czech (Czechoslovak) 
state in Europe, i.e. international relations, underwent quite radical changes.
As stated by Masaryk, the fears addressed by Palacký became reality, i.e. the domi-
nation of Austrian policy by the Pan-German programme of the German Emperor. For 
him, Germany and the Germans became the main threat to the Czech state, and for stop-
ping German expansion he suggested the creation of a bloc of Slavic states in Central 
Europe – Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia – including the corridor between 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which would divide Austria and Hungary. An alliance 
of these three countries would be guaranteed by Russia (Krejčí, 1993: 65). 
However, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia put a stop to Masaryk’s geopolitical 
considerations, and he returned to an agreement with the Western Powers, mainly the 
USA and France. The territory lying between Germany and Russia now appeared to 
Masaryk as a “danger zone“ (Štěpanovský, 1998: 20). The efforts of the nations living 
in this zone (Zwischeneuropa) had to be, according to Masaryk, oriented towards 
mutual cooperation and supporting democracy, which linked them with the Western 
Powers. In his notion the idea of a Central European (con)federation reaching from 
Finland to Greece (Cabada, 2002: 17), appears, and there were other versions of 
this federation, which were smaller. Even in 1918, just before the declaration of the 
independent Czechoslovak Republic, Masaryk became the Chairman of the Mid-
European Democratic Union in Philadelphia, in which representatives of 16 nations 
from Denmark to Greece were brought together. In view of the tensions between the 
old and new Central European states, which flared soon after the end of the First World 
War, the Union never began to work properly however (Štěpanovský, 1998: 20).
We can, without a doubt, regard Czechoslovak interwar foreign policy as more 
multilateral than bilateral; it could even be said that in bilateral relations, especially 
with neighbouring countries, Czechoslovakia had great problems. The forum for 
Czechoslovak foreign policy of a multilateral orientation became both the League of 
Nations and also the Little Entente, a military-political association of Czechoslovakia, 
Romania and Yugoslavia, aimed primarily against Hungarian revisionism. The 
protracted League of Nations crisis, which had already started with the USA refusing 
to join, limited the multilateral activity of Czechoslovakia from the very beginning, 
and the Little Entente underwent a crisis in the second half of the 1930s, which is 
linked especially with the turn away from democracy in Romania and Yugoslavia. 
Despite this, the Foreign Minister and second Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš 
had similar intentions as Masaryk when the former tried (unsuccessfully) to turn the 
Little Entente into a confederate structure. The Munich Agreement, the occupation 
of the Czech lands in 1939 and also post-war development confirmed Spykman’s 
observations on small states mentioned at the beginning of the article. Even during the 
Second World War Beneš developed a proposal for a Czechoslovak-Polish federation, 
which was of course simply unacceptable to Stalin.
We can, in my opinion, evaluate Masaryk’s and Beneš’s conception of Czech 
(Czechoslovak) foreign policy as a mixture of realism and idealism. Realism is shown 
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especially in the effort to anchor Czechoslovakia to a power; the USA, Russia, Great 
Britain and France were came in question, and Italy partially also. After the war the USA 
of course withdrew into isolationism and Great Britain back to “splendid isolation”. 
Russia and, soon after the war, Italy, were governed by non-democratic political 
representation. The logical orientation towards France was limited by a decline in the 
power bases of this state and also the opportunism of the French political élite after the 
Marseille attack in 1934, during which Yugoslav King Alexander and French Foreign 
Minister Barthou were assassinated (Cabada, 2002: 21).
We could regard the policies of interwar Czechoslovakia, using contemporary 
terminology, rather as the politics of a medium-sized state. The relatively high ambi-
tion represented by such policies (for example the thesis on the island of democracy 
in Central Europe, from which democratic ideas spread to the surrounding areas) 
became the subject of criticism due to its apparently unrealistic nature after the Munich 
Agreement. Critics pointed to the fact that Czechoslovakia overestimated itself when 
it did not want to be a small state. a new foreign-political policy had to be the clear 
focus of a small state towards a regional hegemony such as Nazi Germany65 (Rataj, 
1997: 147), and the Soviet Union after the Second World War. We can understand the 
Communist coup and the subjection to the Soviet Union, including the occupation 
of Czechoslovakia in 1968, as further confirmation of Spykman’s thoughts on small 
states.
After 1989 the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, later the Czech Republic, was 
reconstructed on the basis of the aforementioned principles, i.e. from the historical 
experiences of Czechoslovak statehood. 
Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic
The first foreign policy of the Czech Republic, in the form of a coherent document, 
was formulated in 1998, on the initiative of the minority Social Democratic Gover-
nment of Prime Minister Miloš Zeman. This does not of course mean that a Czech 
foreign policy, with its own foundations and priorities, had not been formulated 
prior to that. As Václav Kotyk (1995: 65) writes, in the first years of its existence the 
Czech Republic had no foreign policy, but rather the ideas of policy priorities, which 
were an effort to join the EU and NATO, development of multilateral relations with 
neighbouring countries and world powers and support of multilateral activities to 
secure peace. The creators of the foreign policy, which corresponded to the changed 
priorities, were mainly Prime Minister Václav Klaus, Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec 
and President Václav Havel.
President Havel, in particular, showed the tendency to push for such a foreign 
policy, which would go beyond the classic strategies of small states. Pragmatism 
65 Geopolitically oriented considerations of small states only seldom consider the nature of a political 
régime of a specific state. The (regional) power is always a hegemony and the small state must therefore 
reflect this reality without consideration of the character of the political system in this country. 
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belongs especially to this strategy, which P. Robejšek regards as “discreet egoism”. 
According to Robejšek, “discreet egoism is the first commandment of a foreign policy 
of a small state. One of the permanent goals of foreign policy of a small state should 
be an intensive search for situations which enable it to share in the benefits of activities 
whose costs are borne predominantly by others (“free rider position”). Possible future 
ethical doubts are irrational” (Robejšek, 2002: 31). 
In some cases Havel’s foreign policy activities quite significantly exceed this 
demarcation. Let us remind ourselves of his engagement in the field of the defence of 
human rights, invitations to the Dalai Lama of Tibet or the official representative of 
Taiwan and the like. The activities of President Havel of course frequently had a mar-
kedly personal nature and need not always be presented as the foreign policy of the 
Czech Republic. We can say the same, to a certain extent, about the president’s support 
of the ideas of the Visegrád cooperation. Furthermore, the official formulator of Czech 
foreign policy is, under the constitution, not the President but the government, which is 
responsible to the Parliament of the Czech Republic (Lopez-Reyes, 1999: 31). 
The foreign policy basis of the first government of Prime Minister Klaus can 
be deduced mainly from a speech made by Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec before 
the Lower House of the Parliament of the Czech Republic in April 1993. Minister 
Zieleniec stated in the speech that: “through the division of Czechoslovakia the Czech 
Republic, from the geopolitical viewpoint, split itself from the part of the Danubian 
region, which immediately neighbours the unstable zones of Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe … .“ The Minister further defined the priority of Czech foreign policy: good 
relations with neighbouring countries; entry to the EC/EU, NATO and the WEU; good 
relations with powers and monitoring of the situation in Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe. The foreign-political activity of the Czech Republic should, according to 
J. Zieleniec, concentrate on part of Europe, i.e. the Euro-Atlantic zone; on the other 
hand, “countries in the Euro-Atlantic zone do not represent an existential, strategic or 
specific priority for the near future”. 
We can see, therefore, that the foreign-political priorities of the Czech Republic 
during Klaus’s government could be regarded as characteristic of the policy of 
a small state. The basic goal was integration into Euro-Atlantic and Western 
European structures, the development of good relations with world powers (in his 
speech Minister Zieleniec named the USA, Germany, France Great Britain, “other 
European states“, Japan and Canada) and smooth relations with neighbours. It is 
noteworthy that in foreign-political priorities the issue of Central European political 
and economic cooperation does not appear. This approach corresponds, according to 
V. Kotyk (1995: 70–71), to the lack of interest on the part of V. Klaus and J. Zieleniec 
in Visegrád Four cooperation; as Kotyk mentions, both politicians assumed that 
regional cooperation in Central Europe (in addition to the Visegrád Four, there is also 
the Central European Association of Free Trade/CEFTA and the Central European 
Intiative/CEI) could hinder the “star pupil” which is how both politicians regarded 
the Czech Republic. 
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Let us remind ourselves that theoreticians regard involvement in a multilateral 
strategy to be one of the main characteristics of medium-sized states. On the other 
hand, small states advocate bilateral foreign policy as the best strategy (Robejšek, 
2002: 32). In the first years of the Czech Republic Klaus’s governments advocated 
a bilateral foreign policy, meaning that instead of coordinated negotiations of Central 
European countries with EU bodies there would be “separate” negotiations of each 
Central European country with the European Union. 
Czech foreign policy in the first half of the 1990s was formed in clear connection 
with the process of transformation of the security situation of the Czech Republic. After 
the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 
the first task of Czech (Czechoslovak) policy to be dealt with was ensuring security. In 
discussions two basic possibilities arose: 1) the idea of neutrality based on the Austrian 
model, as part of the framework of security order in Europe, guaranteed especially by 
the CSCE; and 2) the idea of joining NATO and the WEU. The first idea, advocated in 
the first months and years by the official representatives of Czechoslovakia too, was 
rejected a after the outbreak of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the former 
Soviet Union, even if a definite alternative appeared in the years to come66. 
The idea of neutralization of the group of countries lying between Western Europe 
(NATO) and the Soviet Union (Russia) was to a certain extent based on the aforemen-
tioned notions of T. G. Masaryk. The “neutralization” of this Central European zone 
(Europe in between) would of course expose the Czech Republic to a far greater risk 
than being oriented to Western Europe, i.e. the Euro-Atlantic alternative, even if it 
included Germany, which in the past was aggressive. The fear of the power ambitions 
of Germany, indicating a certain misunderstanding of the development of (West) 
German politics after the Second World War, could have to a certain extent influenced 
considerations of official Czech (Czechoslovak) representatives in the first years after 
the fall of Communism.
The tendency towards the idea of strengthening of membership of NATO of course 
did not completely quell the fears of the Czech public and parts of the political élite 
of Germany. The fears of Russian hegemonic ambitions, possible “resentment“ of 
Germany as a power after its reunification, and also the realistic response of the real 
strengths/weaknesses of France and Great Britain logically led Czech diplomacy to 
the idea of understanding the USA as a priority security partner. In this idea all the 
main representatives of the Czech foreign policy agreed. The American presence in 
Europe was understood by Czech politicians not only as an instrument of controlling 
Russia but also Germany (Waisová, 2004: 192). The fact that Bill Clinton promoted to 
the post of Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, a Czech émigré with very friendly 
relations with Václav Havel and the whole Czech Republic, undoubtedly contributed 
to good Czech-American relations.
66 In his article, V. Kotyk (1995) draws attention to the idea of Zdeňek Mlynář of a zone of neutral states 
from Sweden to Austria, which would also include the Czech Republic.
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The basic foundation of Czech foreign policy did not change even after the election 
of governments where the Czech Social Democrats predominated. Indeed it was 
the Cabinet of Miloš Zeman that presented a coherent foreign policy of the Czech 
Republic. The first sentence of this document characterizes the Czech Republic as 
a medium-sized state in a European context. At a time when the Czech Republic had 
already been promised NATO membership (Madrid summit in 1997), the priorities 
were EU membership; involvement in securing European and international security; 
better quality relations with Slovakia and good relations with other neighbours; regional 
cooperation in Central Europe and active involvement in international organizations. 
The development of good relations with Russia and states of Southeastern Europe, and 
economic relations with the countries of Asia, Africa, Australia and Latin America, 
are mentioned as partial intentions of Czech foreign policy. The Czech government 
declared its preparedness to participate in the framework of the possibilities for the 
formulation and fulfilling of the new international development strategy.
We see, therefore, that the new government, and Foreign Minister Jan Kavan, 
presented a far more coherent idea of the foreign policy of the Czech Republic than 
its predecessors, which included also some fields which at least partially exceeded the 
concept of how theoreticians define the foreign policy of a small state. Here I have 
in mind both the idea of regional cooperation of post-Communist Central European 
states67, and the issue, for example, of development aid, which of course after 1995 
was being dealt with by Klaus’s government, and then the government of Josef Tošov-
ský. The philosophy, in my judgment, displayed a greater foreign-political awareness 
of Czech diplomacy, which at least in some considerations exceeds the paradigm of 
a small country. Several statements of Foreign Minister Jan Kavan testify to this reality 
(see Kavan, 1998; Kavan 2002), and also some concrete steps of the Czech govern-
ment. One of these was, for example, the “Czech-Greek initiative”, which should have 
contributed to the stopping of NATO aerial bombardments of Yugoslavia in 1999. This 
initiative signified the first more serious split between Czech diplomacy and the USA, 
which we can regard as the first step in the process of the cooling of Czech-American 
relations (Waisová, 2004: 192).
In his statements Minister Kavan himself was not completely unambiguous concer-
ning his understanding of the position of the Czech Republic in international relations. 
As we mentioned, the government policy of 1998 marked out the Czech Republic 
as a medium-sized state; as for example J. Kavan did in his article Foreign Policy of 
the Czech Republic: the Possibilities of a Medium-Sized State (2001). At other times 
he confirmed that the Czech Republic belongs among small states (Kavan, 1998: 4). 
The strongest opposition party, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), on the other hand, 
regarded the foreign policy of Zeman and Špidla’s government as the policy of a small 
state, and especially in the relationship to the EU and the dominant countries in it. 
67 Especially within the framework of revitalized Visegrád cooperation, which should have helped the new 
Slovak Government of Prime Minister M. Dzurinda to lead Slovakia into the second wave of enlarge-
ment of NATO and, at the same time as other nations of the Visegrád Four, into the European Union. 
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According to J. Zahradil (2002: 8), this policy manifests itself by a loosening of the 
Euro-Atlantic ties, and anti-Americanism, which is not in accord with the national in-
terests of the Czech Republic. Zahradil also argued that Czech diplomacy should play 
a similar role to the foreign policy of Scandinavian countries, which he says: “have 
long had a visible foreign policy profile (in their case in the field of human rights pro-
tection and active involvement in multilateral world organizations)“ (Zahradil, 2002: 
8). We see, therefore, that the Shadow Foreign Minister J. Zahradil regards the foreign 
policy philosophy of the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) as the policy of a small state, 
which is too subservient to the pressure of the powers of the core of the EU (especially 
France and Germany). Personally, I would want Czech foreign policy to be rather the 
policy of a medium-sized state based on a Euro-Atlantic tie (understood as the USA) 
and international organizations.
We cannot, however, fail to mention that the Civic Democratic Party and its 
Honorary Chairman and, from 2003, President of the Czech Republic, V. Klaus, has 
adopted a stance against some American activities too, which they understood as uni-
lateral. Here I have in mind the position of the political élite on military intervention in 
Afghanistan and, above all, in Iraq. Politicians representing, and possibly influencing 
Czech foreign policy in its positions towards the USA, are divided into three groups: 
1) the pro-American stream, represented especially by Václav Havel and Foreign 
Minister Cyril Svoboda (since July 2002); 2) anti-American, represented by the Czech 
Communists, but also by definite groups in the Czech Social Democratic Party (for 
example V. Laštůvka and J. Kavan) and the Civic Democratic Party; and 3) the stream 
“in the middle”, represented by the government (Waisová, 2004, 195).
It would be a mistake to speak about relations of Czech official representatives to 
the USA as anti-Americanism, as does J. Zahradil; “pure“ anti-Americanism occurs 
mainly in political parties which we can regard as radical (primarily the Communist 
Party of Bohemia and Moravia). Rather than anti-Americanism we could speak 
about the critical tendency of American policy to act unilaterally. These tendencies 
are shown also by Czech politicians, whom we can otherwise regard as significantly 
pro-American. Let us remind ourselves, for example, of the very critical position of 
President Václav Havel on the convergence between NATO and Russia ahead of the 
Prague NATO summit. When Havel gave a speech to senators on 27 November 2001 
he presented a number of reasons why NATO should be “very reserved, very careful 
and very cautious“ in convergence with Russia. One of the reasons why Havel fears 
convergence is “creeping bipolarization“ is because “ahead of every summit of the 
Alliance these two largest and most powerful members (i.e. the USA and Russia) meet 
and agree a little on how everything will continue“ (Havel, 2002: 8). In Havel’s speech 
we see fear of the dominance of the USA inside NATO, and also fear a return to power 
politics, in which small states are the object of international relations.
The so far most recent official Czech foreign policy was accepted on 3 March 2003, 
for the period 2003–2006. Despite some differences that can be found, the material is 
very similar to the policy of 1998. In the policy, the Czech Republic is again defined 
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as a medium-sized state on the European scale. In this policy, unlike that of 1998, 
China does not appear as a strategic economic partner. In it the question of emphasis 
on adherence to human rights, in countries with which the Czech Republic wishes to 
deepen mutual relations, is toned down. Less space is devoted also to international 
development aid in the policy. Mention of CEFTA has entirely disappeared from the 
document.
We can therefore summarize that the policy materials of the Czech Government and 
further significant political institutions portray Czech foreign policy as the policy of 
a small state whose goal is to be included in the Euro-Atlantic sphere (which, with entry 
to NATO and the EU, was successful), develop good relations with non-neighbouring 
countries (which was more or less successful) and develop economic diplomacy. The 
policy contains some other points, but in comparison with the priorities mentioned 
earlier they are not regarded as too important.
In my opinion, what is most puzzling is the absence of a more consistent analysis 
of Czech-German relations and their further development. Practically all authors of the 
analysis of Czech foreign policy (e.g. Had – Kotyk, 1998; Pick, 2002; Rouček, 2002; 
Robejšek, 2002) agree with the opinion that in view of the already increased trade 
between Germany and the Czech Republic already, Czech diplomacy must regard 
relations with Germany as of key importance. In the analysed policies it is clear that 
the same space was devoted to relations with Germany as, for example, to relations 
with Hungary, with which the Czech Republic has no borders. Czech-German relations 
have, furthermore, an “asymmetrical” character – while Germany is a key partner for 
the Czech Republic, German diplomacy understands the Czech Republic as one of 
a number of neighbours; the German media thus mentions the Czech Republic mainly 
in connection with the Sudeten German problem (Huddala, 2004). 
Analysts evaluate that the “danger zone” between Germany and Russia was 
“disturbed“ by the democratization of Germany after the Second World War68, but in 
a significant section of Czech politics suspicion of the “good intentions“ of Germany 
remained, and especially in connection with the fear of pressure for damages or other 
type of settlement in connection with the post-war transfer of the German minority 
from Czechoslovakia. Neither can relations with the USA be regarded as uncompli-
cated. Czech politics understood, and still understands good relations with the USA 
as a safety guarantee against Russia and Germany, but currently it does not have an 
understanding of some American foreign policy activities and fears a new “agreement” 
between the USA and Russia along the lines of the “Yalta” model. 
Part of Czech politics sees a solution in the tendency towards the pro-federalist 
group in the EU, including strengthening of the European pillar of NATO (Foreign 
Minister C. Svoboda and the Christian Democratic Union-Czech People’s Party 
/KDU-ČSL/) and part of the Social Democratic Party); another section sees it rather in 
preference to American policy and the dominance of USA in the Euro-Atlantic space; 
68 On the other hand a (justified) lack of faith in Russia, i.e. the idea, that Russia has abandoned its 
hegemonic policy towards Central Europe, remains (Dobrovský, 2001) 
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and a third group rather vaguely speaks about the importance of multilateral activities 
to ensure security (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)). If anything 
was lacking in Czech foreign policy it was mainly the policy of securing vital national 
interests.
Czech foreign policy as the policy of a small state
The question of whether Czech foreign policy is the policy of a large state or 
whether it is about the policy of a medium-sized state cannot be, in my opinion, answered 
completely unambiguously. Regardless of the frequently very high ambitions of 
foreign policies of Czech governments after 1998 Czech foreign policy continues in the 
manner set in place by the first government of V. Klaus, which we can unambiguously 
regard as the course of a foreign policy of a small country. This becomes the case, for 
example, in comparison with foreign policy of another Central European state, i.e. 
Poland. Of course due also to its geostrategic position, territorial extent and population 
size – as early as the beginning from the 1990s Poland is showing tendencies that it is 
becoming a regional hegemony.
I do not want to suggest that Polish foreign policy is, in comparison to its Czech 
counterpart, qualitatively better. Instead, I am inclined to the opinion of M. Had and V. 
Kotyk (1998: 15), who say that Poland has the tendency to overestimate its possibili-
ties. Czech foreign policy has, in my opinion, overestimated its possibilities only once 
(the aforementioned Czech-Greek Initiative), otherwise it has followed a careful path. 
On the other hand, comparisons with Poland can reveal that Czech foreign policy lacks 
a coherent policy on a number of questions, frequently in cases which concern regions 
or countries situated in the immediate proximity of the Czech Republic. An example 
could be the issue of Ukraine, where Czech diplomacy resorts only to empty phrases 
which lack substance. To expect that Czech diplomacy engages in the same way as 
Poland or Lithuania69 is evidently exaggerated, but the ambitions of Czech diplomacy 
undoubtedly show that in the issue in question it was not possible to present a clearly 
and analytically grounded basis.
In certain cases it is clear that Czech Republic has shown, and continues to 
show, efforts to be a medium-sized state and at the standard already mentioned by 
J. Zahradil, i.e. the level of an international political profile which is visible in the 
long-term. We can regard the contact of V. Havel with significant dissidents at the 
national and international level as such an activity (paradoxically, this is exactly what 
is frequently criticized by Zahradil’s party as damaging the economic interests of the 
Czech Republic). Others are a long-term stable critical position regarding the state 
of human rights in Cuba, the work of Czech soldiers in the international military 
and stabilizing missions or efforts to strengthen Czech development aid70. However, 
69 There is more on this question in the article by Jerzy J. Wiatr and elsewhere in this issue. 
70 Development aid or development cooperation are without doubt are two the activities through which 
small states can gain the profile of a medium-sized power. Nations such as Norway, the Netherlands or 
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Czech policy in these sectors in the meantime operates in a markedly inconsistent and 
selective way. Practically the entire political élite in the most recent period resigned 
over the critical position of the attitude towards the state of human rights in China; 
in this light therefore, the “Cuban activity” appears as unsystematic. Likewise, it is 
important to mention that development cooperation is frequently developed not 
entirely transparently – there was, for example, no explanation of basis on which 
the criteria was agreed for deciding the reduced number of countries on which 
development aid was focused. 
In conclusion, Czech foreign policy in the medium-term perspective could become 
the foreign policy of a medium-sized state. This assumption here is mainly a streng-
thening of the economic power of the Czech Republic and the effective investment of 
the means gained through this, especially into transparent development aid. Therefore, 
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